Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
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The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), responding to 1996 SECDEF guidance, began a dialog with the warfighting Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs) to improve timely support to their operational requirements realizing that some new technologies, concepts, and threats pose questions that can best be answered by responsive field assessments employing a realistic threat environment. The answers to these questions can immediately help improve current operating capability. During the planning phase for implementing SECDEF guidance, the following became apparent:

• The Unified Commands, DOT&E, and the Services do not have adequate resources to conduct joint field assessments/experiments.

• A transformation has occurred since the end of the Cold War, which places an emphasis on hybrid threat assessments/experiments.

• Coordinated national-level operational and intelligence support is critical to providing accurate, timely, and focused support when addressing joint interoperability and operational issues.

An OFA partnership was created with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), to provide coordinated national-level support of urgent CINC joint operational assessment requirements. The underlying rationale was to give the JCS and the CINCs the ability to explore operational concepts and address critical operational issues with responsive, well-coordinated partnership support. Although the focus was directed exclusively to the needs of the CINCs, the value added to the intelligence community, as a result of close and continuous participation, has been the windfall of opportunities expressed in the ability to confirm intelligence estimates, improve/initiate operational procedures, gain in-depth understanding of warfighting intelligence needs, and provide rapid solutions to specific problematic operational scenarios. Experimentation is central to the program, that is, modest, inexpensive experiments that are conducted relatively quickly. These experiments are called Operational Field Assessments (OFAs).

Congress approved the reprogramming of $3 million of the DOT&E FY97 appropriation to support the warfighting Unified Commands. The FY97 OFA proof-of-concept phase was highly successful, not only in the ability to find solutions to critical CINC operational issues, but also in terms of understanding unique command operational and intelligence requirements. Leadership and participation by DOT&E with the national intelligence agencies and warfighting commands, resulted in significant improvements in execution of OT&E oversight of operational testing. The FY97 OFAs were conducted with the Unified Commands at Service range facilities, supported by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine equipment and personnel, both active and reserve.

The success of the FY97 OFA concept was endorsed by letters of support and additional requirements for FY98. OFA support was requested from USACOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USPACOM/USFK. In addition, DOT&E, NSA, NRO, and DIA requirements for intelligence production were satisfied with in-depth coordination. Building on the initial successes of the OFA Program in FY97, Congress appropriated $4.0 million for FY98. Funds were released in March 1998.

The OFA partners considered fifty FY98 OFA requests from the CINCs. A number of the Unified Commands shared the same or similar operational requirements and information needs. Consequently, some of the CINCs' requests involved issues that were similar enough that they could be combined and satisfy several CINCs' requirements at once. This coordination between the partners and the Unified Commands resulted in a prioritized list of OFAs for execution in FY98 and FY99.

The highest priorities were given to command requirements associated with "HOT SPOTS"; i.e., the Persian Gulf, Korea, Bosnia, and the Caribbean. This process produced ten OFAs supporting seven CINCs (USACOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USSOCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USTRANSCOM, and USPACOM/USFK) to be executed with FY98 funds in FY98 and FY99. These OFAs provide the warfighters with new tools to successfully plan and execute operational mission requirements, including the war against drugs.

Using reprogrammed funding in FY97 and programmed funds in FY98, the OFA Program has performed OFAs answering specific operational requirements submitted by the CINCs with invaluable improvements in operational intelligence support and operational test and evaluation oversight. The OFAs were done on short notice in response to CINC-identified requirements. They have been successful and were received favorably by the supported Unified Commands. The Service field elements participating in the OFAs have been very responsive and contributed significantly to the success of the assessments. The OFA Program has contributed significantly to the warfighting CINCs and helped maintain flexibility and adaptability in the face of real world uncertainties.

The OFA program was not funded in FY99, therefore, this year's report addresses those FY98 approved field assessments supported in FY98-99 within resource constraints.

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation received SECDEF guidance to improve support to the warfighter and provide technical support to Advanced Concept and Technology Demonstrations. The Secretary's vision was amplified by the National Defense Panel Report, "Transforming Defense," issued in December 1997 which stated that " . . . it is only through field exercises, primarily joint in nature, that we can adjust and iron out problems before they occur in actual combat" and " . . . the real leverage of future capabilities from experiments is in the joint venue." The OFA Program arose from and was motivated by the pressing need for a quick response to support the CINCs in assessing how best to employ military assets in particular threat environments. The Unified Commands have documented critical operational needs, consisting primarily of tactical issues within their respective Areas of Interest, for which innovative and adaptive responses were required. The OFA Program focused on the recognition that CINCs' warfighting requirements and operational considerations were dynamic and rapidly changing.

An OFA was a quick-response, low-cost field assessment conducted by the Unified Command, the Services, and the OFA Partners in support of warfighting CINC operational requirements. They were conducted in a realistic field environment focused on CINC concerns regarding joint operational concepts against diverse threat estimates within a given area of interest. OFAs relied on a dynamic process providing coordinated operational and intelligence support to the warfighting CINCs by the OFA Partners within their mission and functional areas of responsibility. With coordinated support, the OFA was an effective tool for rapidly answering specific operational questions. While the assessments were focused to meet a critical CINC need, they also served to enhance the realistic portrayal of the threat during operational tests and provided the added benefit of clarifying and coordinating intelligence questions. The answers to these questions enabled a sharper focus of follow-on resource expenditures in the collection and evaluation of new or more comprehensive intelligence gathering. The focus of intelligence support was enhanced as a result of increased understanding of CINC operational needs and capabilities. OFA's are field experiments in the spirit of the National Defense Panel Report, December 1997, which stated the following:

• The advantage of the experiment is that there are some things that can only be revealed in the field.

• Practical experimenting allows us to experience what may only be theorized at the discussion table.

• It is only through field experiments, primarily joint in nature, that problems can be adjusted and ironed out before they occur in actual combat.

• Each Service may conduct experiments to examine its own role in the future.

A listing of the relationships of the hot spots and the command requirements is shown in Table 1.

• C130 / Helicopter Manportable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS): USSOCOM aircraft and helicopters face significant challenges when required to operate in an environment where potential adversaries are equipped with first, second, and/or third-generation infrared homing MANPADS. The primary purpose of this project was to determine the capabilities and vulnerabilities of specific aircraft and helicopters operated by SOCOM in such an environment. The project consisted of two assessments, Aircraft–MANPADS and MH60-MANPADS. Specific objectives of the assessments included: (1) determining the best altitude for aircraft egress/ingress and gunship orbits in a MANPADS environment; and (2) determining flare and jammer effectiveness against MANPADS. Assessment results provided a measure of aircraft survivability in such a MANPADS environment. Preliminary aircraft vulnerability and countermeasure effectiveness were assessed with the planned mission profiles. Maximum lock-on altitudes for each of the tested seekers and flare and jammer effectiveness for the three aircraft were determined. The MH-60 MANPADS assessment was completed in August 1998; and the C-130 MANPADS assessment was completed in February 1999.

• Surface to Air Missile (SAM) / Mobile Missile Launcher (MML): The Combatant Commands have significant concerns about potentially hostile air defense capabilities against U.S. and coalition air operations. Specifically, many countries have employed a variety of new air defense operational concepts involving SAM system modifications to enhance their effectiveness and survivability. A number of joint operational issues have arisen concerning the operational performance and effectiveness of such modified air defense assets and the tactics, techniques, and procedures being employed by potentially hostile air defense systems. In response to these concerns, this project consisted of four assessments: a USCENTCOM SAM Assessment, a USEUCOM SAM Assessment, a USPACOM/USFK SAM Assessment, and a USCENTCOM Mobile Missile Launcher (MML) Assessment. The consolidated list of Unified Command concerns focused on the operational performance of foreign SAMs—including traditional, non-traditional, and hybrid SAM system operations—against U.S. and coalition aircraft. Unified Command assessment requests were broad and comprehensive; therefore, the planning represented a nested approach to optimizing resources by reconfiguring threat system assets to address issues of concern for specific Unified Commands. Assessment objectives focused on evaluating the effectiveness and vulnerabilities of the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by various air defense assets against a variety of U.S. and coalition air operational requirements. The USCENTCOM MML assessment was incorporated into this project to evaluate USCENTCOMs desire to assess MML attack operations in an environment where MML is a priority asset defended by an integrated SAM threat. The focus of these efforts was to improve the capability to locate, identify, and eliminate high-value, short dwell time targets and assess damage within tactically meaningful timelines. Where possible, national and theater collection systems, unattended ground sensors, and data fusion cells were included in the assessment scenarios.

1. Evaluate the effectiveness and operational performance of foreign SAMs while employing unconventional engagement techniques and hybrid configurations of SAMs against U.S. and coalition aircraft.
2. Evaluate MML operational procedures while serving as a priority target for U.S. and coalition aircraft protected by SAM systems employed in the first objective. Issues addressed included:

1. The usage of MML as a "real" target of opportunity for OPERATION DESERT LIGHTNING. It provided for the training of long-range surveillance (LRS) teams performing "talk-on target" procedures in directing close air support (CAS) aircraft and surveillance by "direct action" for special operations forces (SOF) teams.
2. The use of national and theater collection assets and the Forward Sensor Enclave to identify and locate MML assets for the Semi-Automated IMINIT Processing (SAIP) Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration.
3. The use of MML equipment (transporter-erector-launcher and missile) for "hands-on" detailed familiarization during MML pre-launch, convoy and hide operations.

• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Target Surveillance Counter Terrorism: Special Operations units are tasked with very challenging counter terrorism (CT) and counter proliferation (CP) missions. USSOCOM requested an evaluation of the ability of existing UAV systems to support the planning and execution of these missions. Although UAVs were designed for other missions, USSOCOM thought UAVs might have the potential to provide significant support to the CT and CP missions with little or no modification. Specifically, this OFA assessed the effectiveness of UAV systems for CT and CP mission planning purposes (i.e., to identify the best infiltration/exfiltration routes specifying the location and status of targets). The assessment revealed that the platform showed significant promise if technologies continue to develop along existing trends. The information provided by these reconnaissance systems was extremely valuable in assisting in target identification. However, technical limitations were identified during the conduct of the assessment, which resulted in less than optimal performance. The most significant of these limitations were inadequate power supplies for the onboard electronic devices and the noise generated by the combustible engines. This operational field assessment determined the necessary set of technical conditions required to effectively use this platform in support of joint special operations.

• Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR): This FY98 OFA was designed to explore the capability of ROTHR to monitor airborne traffic at ranges greater than 2000 nautical miles (nm). Since ROTHR performance is variable, and performance beyond 1800 nm is known to be a rare occurrence, the day-to-day operations of the radar had been restricted to within 1800 nm. Accordingly, operator confidence in the proposed extension was low. The OFA was an attempt to quantify the utility of the radar to overall counter drug operations within the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. During the OFA, statistically uniform data were gathered on an operationally non-interfering basis over a period of 12 months at ranges of 2000 to 2400 nm from the Virginia radar site. Analysis of the acquired data confirmed the rarity of the long-range performance at about10 percent of the available time, making the radar not operationally suitable for around-the-clock tactical operations. However, at those times when radar performance was adequate to reach beyond the nominal range, the information it provided was of great utility from a surveillance point of view. Data acquired during the OFA revealed that undocumented air traffic deep within South America at night is much more common than previously believed. Furthermore, those data clearly showed geographic points of origin and destinations not previously known through available intelligence sources. The gathering of statistical routing, traffic density, and timing information deep inside South America, at little cost or effort, represents a new avenue for intelligence gathering within the counter drug operational community. This new source of operational intelligence, derived from the OFA effort, will be incorporated, as appropriate, into future counter drug operations.

• Air Intercept Capability Using Podded Radar and Aviator's Night Vision Imaging System (ANVIST): During 1998, this OFA was used to conduct extensive simulations of the operational effectiveness of the ROTH/APS-144/ANVIS combination. Such simulations are essential since the ROTHR-derived positional and velocity accuracy are poor, thus making traditional operational concepts unworkable. A new operational concept had to be developed and its nominal operational performance assessed. Results of this study revealed that ROTH/APS-144 intercept operations with and without ANVIS would be very different than traditional methods. These new concepts developed during the OFA effort revealed that the ROTH/APS-144/ANVIS combination will be capable of completing approximately 1 in 2 intercepts using the A-37 aircraft as the intercept platform. Although such performance seems limited, it has been assessed to be very effective in the counter drug operational environment and totally disruptive in drug trafficking operations. We are working to identify a small amount of funding to verify the results of the simulations through open-air flight testing. This segment has been delayed by a technical problem that arose within the APS-144 podded radar. This problem has now been resolved; the radar is functioning to specifications and is currently in final developmental flight testing. USSOUTHCOM will need funding to continue this work.

• Semi-Automated Imagery Program (SAIP): This OFA was in support of USACOM. SAIP is a set of integrated exploitation tools that could greatly increase the ability of operational planners to exploit large amounts of data generated by sensors on the High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and the U-2 with its Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System-2 (ASARS-2) and upgrades to ASARS-2. The assessment was focused towards and addressed the high payoff, high value targets, terrain implications, and force structure associated with worldwide CINC requirements. The SAIP system is based on "template technologies," process delimitation, and high capability processors used to focus exploitation requirements to imagery analysts and operational planners while mitigating false alarms. The targets provided for templating were made available for a knowledge base of twenty target templates. OFA support also provided the opportunity to assess SAIP military utility in a diverse temperate environment of coastal, mountain, and forested environment. The equipment was deployed and operated to replicate a realistic battlefield environment as defined by USACOM. Previous assessment venues had been of a desert environment and thus a realistic assessment of a broader worldwide application was required. OFA support, with its flexibility, was well suited to support SAIP assessment where previous efforts to leverage SAIP assessments with more structured joint tests/exercises had not been successful. This illustrates the value of and the need for the Operational Field Assessment Program.

• Rural Airfield Infrared Model: U.S. and coalition aircraft frequently operate in unstable political and military environments all around the world. MANPADS pose potentially significant threats to airlift aircraft conducting these operations, particularly during approaches, landing, and takeoff. Ground commanders have a continuing force protection concern regarding operations in such an environment. Specific force protection issues have included the development of airlift defensive systems, anti-MANPADS tactics, and an associated aircrew anti-MANPADS training program. This OFA developed a model that allows USTRANSCOM to determine the most lethal locations in and around select airports where potential threat systems (primarily MANPADS) could be deployed. This model enables USTRANSCOM planners and commanders to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces and aircraft flying in and out of these airports. It includes:

1. Integration of MANPADS tactics, employment doctrine, and assessed capabilities.
2. Aircraft operational tactics and signature characteristics.
3. Local area topographical and weather data.
4. Determination of the most lethal potential threat deployment locations in and around the airports of interest.
5. Optimization of aircraft routes to minimize vulnerabilities.

1. Is the relative geometric position between the shooter and the aircraft within the performance envelope of the weapon system (e.g., slant range, altitude, launcher elevation angle, etc.)?
2. Is there a line-of-sight between shooter and aircraft unobstructed by geographic features?
3. Is the aircraft position out of the sun exclusion angle of the missile (calculated for any time of day and worldwide location)?
4. Is minimum seeker signal-to-noise ratio achieved based on aircraft infrared irradiance as attenuated by the atmosphere?

• "Percent flight path engageable." Weighs the value of each engagement point across all possible engagement opportunities of the flight path at two-second snapshots. The resulting ground map shows prioritized engagement opportunities. For example, points on the ground with highest 1/3 of shot opportunities are red, ground engagement positions with the fewest 1/3 of shot opportunities are yellow, and the middle 1/3 are aqua.

• "Point on ground threat to flight path." The flight path that is engageable from a specific point on the ground. The user selects a ground point and the model calculates all elements of the trajectory engagable from that point.